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REMARKS
MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH*
Liam Hamilton**
J am extremely privileged and honoured to have been invited to de-
liver the Twenty-fourth Annual John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture
here at Fordham University School of Law.
My appreciation of such privilege and honour was accentuated
when I read the list of previous lecturers who have delivered this lec-
ture in memory of John F. Sonnett, a distinguished graduate of this
University and this School of Law, who devoted his life to the practice
of law and to public service.
I am delighted to follow in their footsteps, particularly in the foot-
steps of my two predecessors as Chief Justice of Ireland, namely the
late Cearbhall 6 Ddlalgh and the recently retired Thomas Finlay.
I hope that you will find my address to you interesting because, in it,
I propose to deal with two matters which are of common interest to
our two countries, viz. the right to life and the right to die, but I intend
to deal only with such rights under the Irish Constitution and the man-
ner in which they have been dealt with by the Irish courts-producing
an Irish solution to an Irish problem.
The authors of our 1937 Constitution, which came into effect on 29
December 1937,1 in including a section on fundamental rights, could
have had little idea of the revolutionary impact it would have on Irish
society. The then-Taoiseach [Prime Minister] Mr. de Valera seems to
have viewed the provisions as being mere "headlines for the Legisla-
ture"-standards for government to aim at, but not for courts to en-
force.2 Articles Forty through Forty-four gave express recognition to
those rights most prized in Western liberal democracies-personal lib-
erty, freedom of expression, equality before the law, ownership of
* The Lecture is adapted from the text delivered on March 28, 1996 as part of
the John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture Series at Fordham University School of Law.
** Chief Justice Hamilton is currently the Chief Justice of the five-member
Supreme Court of Ireland, which determines the constitutionality of statutes and, in
prescribed circumstances, renders advisory opinions to the President of Ireland, Mrs.
Mary Robinson.
Chief Justice Hamilton practiced law as a barrister for 18 years prior to his appoint-
ment to the High Court, which is analogous to the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1974.
While on the High Court, Chief Justice Hamilton served as President of the Special
Criminal Court for over a decade. He was appointed President of the High Court in
1985. He was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by the President of Ire-
land in 1994.
Chief Justice Hamilton was educated at the Christian Brothers School, Mitchel-
stown, Cork. He received his legal education at University College, Dublin, and the
Honorable Society of King's Inns. He received the Benchers Prize for Best King's
Inns Student called to the Bar in his year.
1. John M. Kelly, Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and Constitution 8 (1961).
2. 68 DI Deb. cols. 216-17 (June 9, 1937).
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property, and freedom of religious belief and practice.3 The social
policy of the Catholic Church also made itself felt, in the form of pro-
visions recognising the Family as "the natural primary and fundamen-
tal unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing
inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all
positive law."4
Article Forty-two recognises the right of parents to educate their
children, and pledges the State to support this "as guardian of the
common good. ' 5
Aside from such specific protections, the framers of the Constitu-
tion included some more general statements in Article Forty, section
three. They read as follows:
1. The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practica-
ble, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the
citizen.
2. The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may
from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the
life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.6
The first generation of Irish judges had spent their working lives in
a pure common law environment, where Parliament reigned supreme.
Old habits die hard, and it is not surprising if a certain wariness and
timidity coloured judgments in the first few decades of the new consti-
tutional era. But beginning in the 1960s, the two short sentences of
Article Forty, section three became the basis for a series of revelatory
judgments which have changed Irish society, and indeed continue to
do so.
Since these early years, a new race of right-conscious citizens has
grown up; there has also been a new race of right-conscious young
lawyers and gradually there has been a new breed of judges.
The first case to really break new ground was Ryan v. Attorney
General in 1963. Mrs. Ryan challenged the right of the State to fluo-
ridate water supplied to her home without her consent. 8 She failed in
her application, but Justice Kenny of the High Court held that a right
of "bodily integrity" did exist, being one of an unenumerated list of
rights protected by Article Forty, section three, subsection one.9 As to
where those rights might be found, he said:
In my opinion, the High Court has jurisdiction to consider whether
an Act of the Oireachtas [Parliament] respects and, as far as practi-
cable, defends and vindicates the personal rights of the citizen and
3. See Ir. Const. arts. 40-44.
4. Id art. 41, § 1(1).
5. Id art. 42, §§ 1, 5.
6. Id art. 40, § 3(1)-(2).
7. 1965 I.R. 294 (Ir. S.C. 1964).
8. See id. at 296-97 (Kenny, J.).
9. Id at 313.
MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH
to declare the legislation unconstitutional if it does not. I think that
the personal rights which may be involved [sic] to invalidate legisla-
tion are not confined to those specified in Article 40 but include all
those rights which result from the Christian and democratic nature
of the State. It is, however, a jurisdiction to be exercised with cau-
tion. None of the personal rights of the citizen are unlimited: their
exercise may be regulated by the Oireachtas when the common
good requires this. When dealing with controversial social, eco-
nomic and medical matters on which it is notorious views change
from generation to generation, the Oireachtas has to reconcile the
exercise of personal rights with the claims of the common good and
its decision on the reconciliation should prevail unless it was oppres-
sive to all or some of the citizens or unless there is no reasonable
proportion between the benefit which the legislation will confer on
the citizens or a substantial body of them and the interference with
the personal rights of the citizen. Moreover, the presumption that
every Act of the Oireachtas is constitutional until the contrary is
clearly established applies with particular force to this type of
legislation.
The next matter to be considered... is whether the general guar-
antee in Article 40, section 3, relates only to those personal rights
which are specified in Article 40 or whether it extends to other un-
specified personal rights of the citizen. If it extends to personal
rights other than those specified in Article 40, the High Court and
the Supreme Court have the difficult and responsible duty of ascer-
taining and declaring what are the personal rights of the citizen
which are guaranteed by the Constitution.' 0
It is important to note that the personal rights which the courts are
obliged to ascertain and declare are those which are guaranteed by the
Constitution as arising from the Christian and democratic nature of
the State.
Interestingly, Justice Kenny quoted a Papal Encyclical in support of
the right to bodily integrity," and his willingness to allow his reading
of the Constitution to be informed by documents of a religious rather
than a legal nature marked the beginning of a long and tortuous de-
bate on the proper place of Christian moral teaching in Irish legal and
political life. His identification of the State as Christian in nature was
made baldly, Justice Kenny presumably feeling that it was too obvious
to require proof. Since then, some judges have cited the Preamble to
the Constitution in support of it. That begins: "In the Name of the
Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our
final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred ...
[h]umbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus
Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial .... , 2
10. Id. at 312-13.
11. Id. at 314.
12. Ir. Const. pmbl.
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The Supreme Court in Ryan reaffirmed the existence of unenumer-
ated personal rights, though without reference to Justice Kenny's
Christian/democratic theory.'3 However, within a decade came Mc-
Gee v. Attorney General.4 The Supreme Court, in striking down leg-
islation penalising the importation of contraceptives, found a
constitutionally protected right of privacy within marriage.15 Curi-
ously, only one judge, Justice Griffin, referred to the judgment of Jus-
tice Kenny in Ryan.'6 Justice Walsh, generally recognised as the
intellectual leader of the Court at that time, preferred to find the
source of unnamed rights in the concept of natural law. To this end,
he invoked the wording of the fundamental rights articles in the Con-
stitution, saying:
Articles 41, 42 and 43 emphatically reject the theory that there are
no rights without laws, no rights contrary to the law and no rights
anterior to the law. They indicate that justice is placed above the
law and acknowledge that natural rights, or human rights, are not
created by law but that the Constitution confirms their existence
and gives them protection.
... The very structure and content of the Articles dealing with
fundamental rights clearly indicate that justice is not subordinate to
the law. In particular, the terms of s. 3 of Article 40 expressly
subordinate the law to justice.17
While admitting that "[w]hat exactly natural law is and what pre-
cisely it imports is a question which has exercised the minds of theolo-
gians for many centuries and on which they are not yet fully agreed,"' 8
the judge nonetheless felt that the Constitution imposed a duty on the
Court to consider and decide upon what rights are protected by natu-
ral law, as and when parties to a case attempt to rely on such rights. 19
He further stated:
In this country it falls finally upon the judges to interpret the Con-
stitution and in doing so to determine, where necessary, the rights
which are superior or antecedent to positive law or which are impre-
scriptible or inalienable. In the performance of this difficult duty
there are certain guidelines laid down in the Constitution for the
judge. The very structure and content of the Articles dealing with
fundamental rights clearly indicate that justice is not subordinate to
the law. In particular, the terms of s. 3 of Article 40 expressly
subordinate the law to justice. Both Aristotle and the Christian phi-
losophers have regarded justice as the highest human virtue. The
13. See Ryan, 1965 I.R. at 335-53 (6 Ddlaigh, C.J.).
14. 1974 I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C. 1973).
15. See id. at 312-14 (Walsh, J.).
16. See id. at 332-33 (Griffin, J.).
17. Id. at 310, 318 (Walsh, J.).
18. Id. at 318.
19. See id.
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virtue of prudence was also esteemed by Aristotle as by the philoso-
phers of the Christian world. But the great additional virtue intro-
duced by Christianity was that of charity-not the charity which
consists of giving to the deserving, for that is justice, but the charity
which is also called mercy. According to the preamble, the people
gave themselves the Constitution to promote the common good
with due observance of prudence, justice and charity so that the dig-
nity and freedom of the individual might be assured. The judges
must, therefore, as best they can from their training and their expe-
rience interpret these rights in accordance with their ideal of pru-
dence, justice and charity. It is but natural that from time to time
the prevailing ideas of these virtues may be conditioned by the pas-
sage of time; no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be
final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and
concepts.2
0
Explicit references to the Christian character of the State surfaced
again in the case of Norris v. Attorney General,21 which concerned a
challenge to laws penalising homosexual acts between males. Mr.
Norris submitted that he had a constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy-along the lines of the protection of marital privacy in McGee-
which was being infringed.' In denying the existence of such a right,
a three-to-two majority of the Supreme Court (led by Chief Justice
O'Higgins) was heavily influenced by the Christian ethos of the Con-
stitution itself, and in particular the references to Jesus Christ and the
Trinity in the Preamble. Chief Justice O'Higgins said:
It cannot be doubted that the people, so asserting and acknowledg-
ing their obligations to our Divine Lord Jesus Christ, were proclaim-
ing a deep religious conviction and faith and an intention to adopt a
Constitution consistent with that conviction and faith and with
Christian beliefs. Yet it is suggested that, in the very act of so doing,
the people rendered inoperative laws which had existed for hun-
dreds of years prohibiting unnatural sexual conduct which Christian
teaching held to be gravely sinful. It would require very clear and
express provisions in the Constitution itself to convince me that
such took place. 3
Both Justice McCarthy and Justice Henchy delivered trenchant dis-
senting judgments, yet neither felt able to deny or play down the im-
portance of the Christian ethic in the identification of constitutional
rights. The difference was one of emphasis: Both dissenting judges
preferred to name charity, rather than justice, as the primary Christian
virtue in a pluralist, democratic society. 4 Justice McCarthy com-
20. Id. at 318-19.
21. 1984 I.R. 36 (Ir. S.C. 1983).
22. See id. at 54-55 (O'Higgins, J.).
23. Id. at 64.
24. See id at 75-78 (Henchy, J.); i. at 99-100 (McCarthy, J.).
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mented on Justice Kenny's dictum in McGee v. Attorney General25 as
follows:
In so far as the judgment of Kenny J .. , in referring to the Chris-
tian and democratic nature of the State, is a relevant identification
of source... I would respectfully dissent from such a proposition if
it were to mean that, apart from the democratic nature of the State,
the source of personal rights, unenumerated in the Constitution, is
to be related to Christian theology, the subject of many diverse
views and practices, rather than Christianity itself, the example of
Christ and the great doctrine of charity which He preached. Jesus
Christ proclaimed two great commandments - love of God and love
of neighbour; St. Paul, the Apostle to the Gentiles, declared that of
the great virtues, faith, hope and charity, the greatest of these is
charity .....2
Norris was decided in 1983. That was also the year in which a refer-
endum to amend the Constitution ignited the previously smouldering
issue of abortion in Ireland. But to understand how this even came
about, we must turn back the clock to January 1973 in America, and
Roe v. Wade. 7 A majority of the United States Supreme Court, led
by Justice Blackmun, held that the right to privacy identified in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut28 extended to "a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy." 9 Once the Irish Supreme Court had
found a right to marital privacy in McGee, it was feared by some com-
mentators that the Court might one day extend this right to cover
abortions, in the same manner as Roe v. Wade. In truth, this seemed
an unlikely prospect; abortion had been a statutory offence since 1861,
and both popular and judicial opinion seemed to support this. Indeed,
the majority in McGee went out of its way to point out that its deci-
sion had no bearing on the abortion issue, Justice Walsh commenting
that "this case is not in any way concerned with instruments, prepara-
tions, drugs or appliances, etc., which take effect after conception"30
and later: "[A]ny action on the part of either the husband and wife or
of the State to limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human
life must necessarily not only be an offence against the common good
but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in
question."31 Justice Walsh repeated this observation in G. v. An Bord
Uchtdla,32 a 1978 case concerning adoption, and similar views were
expressed by Justice McCarthy in the Norris case mentioned earlier.3
25. 1974 I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C. 1973).
26. Norris, 1984 I.R. at 99 (McCarthy, J.).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
30. McGee v. Attorney General, 1974 I.R. 284, 305 (Ir. S.C. 1973) (Walsh, J.).
31. Id. at 312.
32. 1980 I.R. 32, 69 (Ir. S.C. 1978) (Walsh, J.).
33. See Norris v. Attorney General, 1984 I.R. 36, 97-98 (Ir. S.C. 1983) (McCarthy,
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As President of the High Court, I gave judgment in the case of At-
torney General v. Open Door Counselling Limited and Dublin
Wellwoman Centre Limited,' subsequently appealed to the Supreme
Court. In the course of the opinion I summarised the legislative his-
tory of abortion in Ireland:
The right to life of the unborn has always been recognised by
Irish law.
It has been recognised at common law; by statute law; as one of
the unenumerated personal rights which the State guaranteed by its
laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, to defend and vindicate
and is specifically acknowledged by the provisions of the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution. Abortion is an interference with
and a destruction of the right to life of an unborn infant in the
mother's womb and as such is an offence contrary to Irish law.
Originally, it was an offence contrary to the common law. The com-
mon law misdemeanour of abortion applied, however, only after the
child had quickened in the womb.
The statute, (43 Geo. III, c. 58) of 1803 enacted that it should be a
felony punishable by death to administer poison with intent to pro-
cure the miscarriage of a woman quick with child and a felony pun-
ishable with imprisonment or transportation for fourteen years to
administer poison with a like intent to a woman who was not proved
to be quick with child.
As stated in the third edition of Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law
p. 275, the distinction between quick and non-quick women gave
rise to complications and this distinction disappeared in the re-en-
actment of the law by the Offences Against the Person Act, 1839,
which established substantially the law in its present form.
The current statute applicable is the Offences Against the Person
Act, 1861.
Section 58 of this Act provides that:-
"Every Woman being with Child, who, with Intent to pro-
cure her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to
herself any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlaw-
fully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with
the like Intent, and whosoever, with Intent to procure the
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with
Child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall
unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever
with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony, and being
convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the Discretion of the
Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life ... or to be
imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years...
Section 59 of the said Act provides that:-
34. 1988 I.R. 593 (Ir. S.C. 1988). The relators in the case, the Society for the Pro-
tection of Unborn Children Ireland Limited, will be referred to hereinafter as
"SPUC.",
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"Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any
Poison or other noxious Thing, or any Instrument or Thing
whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be un-
lawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the Mis-
carriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with
Child, shall be guilty of a Misdemeanour, and being con-
victed thereof shall be liable ... to imprisonment for any
term not exceeding two years..."
The Health (Family Planning) Act, 1979, reaffirmed the ac-
ceptance by the Oireachtas of Sections 58 and 59 of the Of-
fences Against the Person Act, 1861, as setting forth the law of
abortion in this jurisdiction.
Section 10 of the said Act provides that:-
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising -
(a) the procuring of abortion,
(b) the doing of any other thing the doing of which is
prohibited by Section 58 or 59 of the Offences Against
the Person Act, 1861 (which sections prohibit the ad-
ministering of drugs or the use of instruments to pro-
cure abortion or the supplying of drugs or instruments
to procure abortion) or
(c) the sale, importation into the State, manufacture,
advertising or display of abortifacients."
Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861,
protected and protect the foetus in the womb and having regard to
the omission of the words "Quick with child" which were contained
in the statute of 1803 hereinbefore referred to, that protection dates
from conception. Consequently, the right to life of the foetus, the
unborn, is afforded statutory protection from the date of its
conception.
Prior to the enactment of the Eighth Amendment to the Consti-
tution the right to life of the unborn had been referred to and ac-
knowledged by Walsh J. in the course of his judgment in G. v. An
Bord Uchtdla [1980] I.R. 32 when he stated at p. 69 of the report:-
"Not only has the child born out of lawful wedlock the
natural right to have its welfare and health guarded no less
well than that of a child born in lawful wedlock, but a forti-
ori it has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded
against all threats directed to its existence whether before
or after birth. The child's natural rights spring primarily
from the natural right of every individual to life, to be
reared and educated, to liberty, to work, to rest and recre-
ation, to the practice of religion, and to follow his or her
conscience. The right to life necessarily implies the right
to be born, the right to preserve and defend (and to have
preserved and defended) that life, and the right to main-
tain that life at a proper human standard in matters of
food, clothing and habitation. It lies not in the power of
the parent who has the primary, natural rights and duties
in respect of the child to exercise them in such a way as
[Vol. 65
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intentionally or by neglect to endanger the health or life of
the child or to terminate its existence. The child's natural
right to life and all that flows from that right are independ-
ent of any right of the parent as such."
He then repeated what he had said in McGee v. Attorney General
[1974] I.R. 284 at p. 312 of the report:-
"... any action on the part of either the husband and
wife or of the State to limit family sizes by endangering or
destroying human life must necessarily not only be an of-
fence against the common good but also against the guar-
anteed personal rights of the human life in question."
These passages clearly acknowledge:-
(1) the right to life of the unborn;
(2) that that right springs primarily from the natural right of every
individual to life;
(3) the right includes the right to have that right preserved and de-
fended and to be guarded against all threats to its existence before
or after birth;
(4) that it lies not in the power of a parent to terminate its exist-
ence, and
(5) any action on the part of any person endangering human life
must necessarily not only be an offence against the common good
but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in
question.:
Nonetheless, support grew for an amendment to the Constitution ex-
plicitly recognising the right to life of unborn children; the intention
was to copperfasten the existing situation, removing any possibility of
a future court using Roe v. Wade-style reasoning to "frustrate" the
democratic will of the people. Ideally, debate should have been con-
fined to the merits of amending the Constitution in this fashion, but a
series of emotionally charged campaigns on both sides quickly po-
larised positions and led many people to assume that a vote against
the amendment was tantamount to overt support for the introduction
of abortion. It is a pity that public discourse was diverted in this way;
it is possible that the paucity of debate concerning the usefulness of
the amendment, its actual wording, and whether it was likely to
achieve its object, contributed in no small measure to the problems
which were to come. In any event, no party, of any persuasion, fore-
saw the manner in which the Supreme Court would interpret those
words in Attorney General v. .
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution was approved by a
large majority of the people on 7 September 1983.37 It reads: "The
35. Id at 597-99 (Hamilton, P.).
36. 1992 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C. 1992).
37. See John M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution 792 (Gerard Hogan & Gerry Whyte,
3d ed. 1994).
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State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due re-
gard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right."38
The nature and extent of this right was first considered by the
Supreme Court in the Open Door case, mentioned above. The de-
fendants in this case
consider[ed] it essential to the service which they wish[ed] to pro-
vide that they should be at liberty to inform such women who wish
to have an abortion outside the jurisdiction of the Court of the
name, address, telephone number and method of communication
with a specified clinic which they had examined and were satisfied
was one which maintained a high standard,39
but it was declared by the Supreme Court
that the activities of the defendants, their servants or agents in as-
sisting pregnant women within the jurisdiction to travel abroad to
obtain abortions by referral to a clinic; by the making of their travel
arrangements, or by informing them of the identity and location of
and method of communication with a specified clinic or clinics are
unlawful, having regard to the provisions of Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3
of the Constitution. °
Having so declared, this Court then ordered
that the defendants and each of them, their servants or agents be
perpetually restrained from assisting pregnant women within the ju-
risdiction to travel abroad to obtain abortions by referral to a clinic,
by the making for them of travel arrangements, or by informing
them of the identify and location of and the method of communica-
tion with a specified clinic or clinics or otherwise.41
In the course of his judgment in that case, Chief Justice Finlay, hav-
ing considered the admitted facts, stated that
I am satisfied beyond doubt that having regard to the admitted facts
the defendants were assisting in the ultimate destruction of the life
of the unborn by abortion in that they were helping the pregnant
woman who had decided upon that option to get in touch with a
clinic in Great Britain which would provide the service of abortion.
It seems to me to be an inescapable conclusion that if a woman was
anxious to obtain an abortion and if she was able by availing of the
counselling services of one or other of the defendants to obtain the
precise location, address and telephone number of, and method of
communication with, a clinic in Great Britain which provided that
38. Ir. Const. art. 40, § 3(3) (enacted under the Eighth Amendment of the Consti-
tution Act (1983)).
39. Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 1988 I.R. 593, 621 (Ir. S.C.
1988) (Finlay, C.J.).
40. Id at 627 (emphasis added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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service, put in plain language, that was knowingly helping her to
attain her objective.42
The following year, SPUC brought a case against a students' union,
seeking an order restraining them from publishing a booklet contain-
ing information about abortion services in the U.K. In the particular
circumstances, including SPUC's role in the Open Door case, and con-
sidering the nature and objects of the Society, the Supreme Court
(four to one) was prepared to allow that SPUC did have legal standing
to pursue its case.13 SPUC sought injunctions against three more stu-
dents' unions in Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ire-
land) Limited v. Grogan.." The High Court judge referred the case to
the European Court of Justice "for a preliminary ruling on certain
aspects of EC law."45 Seven months later, the Court of Justice ruled
that "it was not contrary to EC law for Ireland to prohibit the [stu-
dents' unions] from distributing [abortion] information," where the
clinics themselves are not involved in the said distribution.16 How-
ever, the Court also held that lawful termination of pregnancy is "a
service within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty of Rome";
therefore, the way was clear under EC law for foreign abortion clinics
themselves "to disseminate information in Ireland about the services
provided."47 The ruling of the Court of Justice provoked an extraordi-
nary political response, in the form of Protocol Number Seventeen to
the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February
1992.1 It purported to immunise the Eighth Amendment to the Con-
stitution from any effects EC law might have on its application in Ire-
land.19 However, the Protocol was soon overshadowed by events,
specifically, the events which culminated in the case of Attorney Gen-
eral v. X.0
The "X." of the title was a fourteen-year-old schoolgirl."1 Following
an alleged rape, she found herself pregnant.s2 The girl and her par-
ents concluded that the best course to pursue was to seek an abortion
in England.53 The parents informed the gardaf [police] of this course
and also raised with them the possibility of having scientific tests car-
42. Id. at 624.
43. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Coogan, 1989
I.R. 734, 741-42 (It. S.C. 1989) (Finlay, C.J.).
44. 1989 I.R. 753 (Ir. S.C. 1989).
45. See Kelly, supra note 37, at 794.
46. Id- at 795.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 795-96.
49. Id. at 795 (quoting the language of Protocol No. 17 to the Treaty on European
Union).
50. 1992 1 I.R. 1 (It. S.C. 1992).
51. Id. at 41 (Finlay, C..).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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ried out on the foetus in order to assist in identifying the father. 4 The
police sought the opinion of the Director for Public Prosecutions
("DPP") on whether such evidence would be admissible.55 The DPP
in turn informed the Attorney General, who applied for and obtained
an interim injunction restraining the girl from having or arranging an
abortion in Ireland, and preventing her from leaving the jurisdiction
for nine months.5 6 At this point the child and her parents were al-
ready in England; they cancelled the arrangements for the abortion
and returned home to contest the injunction. 7
Previous judicial pronouncements in relation to abortion had taken
place in the dry atmosphere of theoretical argument; the contrast with
this case cannot be overemphasised. Judges and lawyers alike are
aware of the maxim "hard cases make bad law," and here was a case
that pulled the heartstrings from every angle: a vulnerable, underage
girl; sexually violated and impregnated against her will; behaving in
obedience to the authorities at all times-even to the extent of re-
turning home and cancelling the abortion appointment. Public sym-
pathy was heightened by the oral evidence of a senior psychologist
that she was in a disturbed emotional state, and might commit suicide.
Public anger was aroused when it became known that it was her very
willingness to help the gardaf that led to the Attorney General bring-
ing proceedings-if the girl and her parents had said nothing, she
would not have been stopped. And this time it was not merely the
provision of information that was in contention: The State was seek-
ing to restrict her liberty to leave the country.
This was the atmosphere in which the Court had to consider its
judgment. The nation waited, and speculated, yet few foresaw the line
that the Court took. The Pro-Life movement had sought by the
Eighth Amendment to remove abortion from the judicial purview, but
of course, once part of the Constitution, the Amendment itself fell to
be interpreted solely and exclusively by the judiciary. In a judgment
that convulsed the nation, four of the five Supreme Court judges held
that, contrary perhaps to popular impression, the Eighth Amendment
required that termination of pregnancy be allowed, albeit only where
it was "established as a matter of probability" that there was "a real
and substantial risk to the life" of the mother if such termination were
not effected.58 That was controversial enough, but to that, the Court
added that "real and substantial risk" was not limited to physical con-
ditions that endangered the mother's life, but could also encompass a
psychological imbalance leading to possible suicide. 59
54. Id.
55. Id
56. See id. at 41-42.
57. Idt at 42.
58. See id. at 53-54.
59. See id. at 55.
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By virtue of the enactment of the Eighth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, Article Forty, section three, subsection three of the Constitu-
tion provides that "[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the
unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws
to defend and vindicate that right."' The right to life of the unborn
therein referred to is not created by law or by the Constitution; the
aforementioned Article merely confirms or acknowledges its existence
and gives it protection.
In the course of his judgment in this case, Chief Justice Finlay
stated:
I accept the submission made on behalf of the Attorney General,
that the doctrine of the harmonious interpretation of the Constitu-
tion involves in this case a consideration of constitutional rights and
obligations of the mother of the unborn child and the interrelation
of those rights and obligations with the rights and obligations of
other people and, of course, with the right to life of the unborn child
as well.
Such a harmonious interpretation of the Constitution carried out
in accordance with concepts of prudence, justice and charity, as they
have been explained in the judgment of Walsh J. in McGee v. The
Attorney General [1974] I.R. 284 leads me to the conclusion that in
vindicating and defending as far as practicable the right of the un-
born to life but at the same time giving due regard to the right of the
mother to life, the Court must, amongst the matters to be so re-
garded, concern itself with the position of the mother within a fam-
ily group, with persons on whom she is dependent. with, in other
instances, persons who are dependent upon her and her interaction
with other citizens and members of society in the areas in which her
activities occur. Having regard to that conclusion, I am satisfied
that the test proposed on behalf of the Attorney General that the
life of the unborn could only be terminated if it were established
that an inevitable or immediate risk to the life of the mother ex-
isted, for the avoidance of which a termination of the pregnancy was
necessary, insufficiently vindicates the mother's right to life.
I, therefore, conclude that the proper test to be applied is that if it
is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and sub-
stantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother,
which can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy,
such termination is permissible, having regard to the true interpre-
tation of Article 40, s. 3, sub-s. 3 of the Constitution.
61
This was sufficient to dispose of what the Court considered to be
"the substantive issue" in the case. In an obiter consideration of the
right to travel, Chief Justice Finlay, Justice Egan, and Justice Heder-
man (who alone dissented on the substantive issue) were of opinion
60. Ir. Const. art. 40, § 3(3).
61. X., 1992 1 I.R. at 53-54 (Finlay, CJ.).
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that the right to travel was not absolute, and could not simpliciter take
precedence over the right to life: This meant that injunctions re-
straining travel abroad to procure abortions could be justified.62 Jus-
tice O'Flaherty and Justice McCarthy, on the other hand, rejected
such restrictions on travel. The former thought it would interfere to
an unwarranted degree with the individual's freedom of movement
and with family authority;63 the latter felt that the court had no juris-
diction to curtail the right to travel on the basis of an intention, even if
that intention were to commit a crime in another jurisdiction.' 4
Justice McCarthy was particularly incensed at what he perceived as
a consistent failure to legislate in the area of abortion. He let his dis-
satisfaction be known in his judgment, saying:
In the context of the eight years that have passed since the Amend-
ment was adopted ... the failure by the legislature to enact the
appropriate legislation is no longer just unfortunate; it is inexcus-
able. What are pregnant women to do? What are the parents of a
pregnant girl under age to do? What are the medical profession to
do? They have no guidelines save what may be gleaned from thejudgments in this case. What additional considerations are there?
Is the victim of rape, statutory or otherwise, or the victim of incest,
finding herself pregnant, to be assessed in a manner different from
others? The Amendment, born of public disquiet, historically divi-
sive of our people, guaranteeing in its laws to respect and by its laws
to defend the right to life of the unborn, remains bare of legislative
direction.65
As a result of the cumulative effect of these decisions, the position
was that:
(1) "if it is established as a matter of probability that there is
a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the
health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the ter-
mination of her pregnancy, such termination is
permissible; ' '66
(2) the dissemination of information with regard to abortion
services available outside the State was unlawful; and
(3) travel abroad for the purpose of obtaining an abortion
was unlawful and could be restrained.
In an effort to deal with these issues, three proposed amendments
to the Constitution were submitted to the people on 25 November
1992.67
62. See id. at 57-58; id. at 62 (Hederman, J.); id. at 92-93 (Egan, J.).
63. Id at 87-88 (O'Flaherty, J.).
64. IdL at 84-85 (McCarthy, J.).
65. Ia at 82.
66. Id at 53-54 (Fmlay, C.J.).
67. See Kelly, supra note 37, at 807.
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Two of these amendments were passed; these dealt with the free-
dom to travel and information relating to services lawfully available.'
The one which was not passed was in the following terms:
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such
termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health,
of the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother
giving rise to a real and substantial risk to her life. not being a risk
of self-destruction.69
The risk of self-destruction had been the ground upon which the
Supreme Court in the X case had held the termination of pregnancy
to be permissible.
Consequently, the rights as laid down by the Supreme Court in this
case [Attorney General v. X.] prevail as no legislation dealing with the
situation has been enacted by our Legislature.
The Legislature did, however, introduce legislation dealing with the
regulation of information relating to services outside the State for the
termination of pregnancies, and the provisions of this legislation were
referred by the President to the Supreme Court for a determination
by it as to whether it or any provision thereof was invalid having re-
gard to the provisions of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court
held that it was not.70
By the time the Oireachtas had passed the bill regulating informa-
tion on foreign abortion services, a new case71 (and with it a new
moral dilemma) was seizing the headlines. Once again, the courts
were placed in a cauldron of emotion and passionate public debate,
and asked to rule on the outer limits of the right to life, and the State's
duty to preserve life. The facts were simple: A twenty-two-year-old
woman had suffered three massive heart attacks during the course of a
minor operation for which she had been given a general anaesthetic.
From that time, she had been in a near-persistent vegetative state
("PVS"), kept alive by artificial nutrition and hydration.73 In 1995,
the woman was forty-five years old. She had remained in the same
state, on life support, for twenty-three years. Her mother and broth-
ers took the view that she should be allowed to die, by the removal of
the artificial feeding mechanisms.74 As the woman was a ward of
court, however, it was necessary to apply to the High Court for a di-
68. Id.
69. Gerard Hogan, Law, Liberty and the Abortion Controversy. in Law and Lib-
erty in Ireland 113, 113 (Anthony Whelan ed., 1993) (providing the text of proposed
Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution Bill, defeated by the electorate on 25 No-
vember 1992).
70. See In re Article 26 & in re Regulation of Information 'Services Outside the
State for Termination of Pregnancies' Bill 1995, 1995 2 I.RLM. 81 (Ir. S.C. 1995).
71. In re Ward of Court, 1995 2 I.L.RM. 401 (Ir. S.C. 1995).
72. Id. (Hamilton, CJ.).
73. Id. at 402.
74. Id
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rection to this effect.75 There, it was found as fact that, while the ward
was not in a permanent vegetative state, "she was very nearly so and
such cognitive capacity as she possessed was extremely minimal. 76
The High Court judge elaborated as follows:
A fully PVS person cannot feel pain and has no capacity for plea-
sure or displeasure even though they may groan or grimace or cry,
especially in response to painful stimuli, nor have they any realisa-
tion whatever of their tragic situation. This is probably the ward's
state but if such minimal cognition as she has includes an inkling of
her catastrophic condition, then I am satisfied that that would be a
terrible torment to her and her situation would be worse than if she
were fully PVS. There is no prospect whatsoever of any improve-
ment in the condition of the ward.77
On 5 May 1995, Justice Lynch granted the order sought by the
ward's mother.78 His decision was appealed by the Attorney General,
the General Solicitor for Minors and Wards of Court who had been
appointed her guardian ad litem, and the institution which had been
caring for her.79
Leaving aside the question of court jurisdiction, the central issue
that faced myself and the other judges of the Supreme Court was this:
In speaking of the "right to life," what do we mean? What constitutes
"life" in this context? It seemed clear to me then, as it does now, that:
As the process of dying is part, and an ultimate inevitable conse-
quence, of life, the right to life necessarily implies the right to have
nature take its course and to die a natural death and, unless the
individual concerned so wishes, not to have life artificially main-
tained by the provision of nourishment by abnormal artificial
means, which have no curative effect and which are intended merely
to prolong life.8°
This right as so defined does not include the right to have life termi-
nated or death accelerated and is confined to the natural process of
dying. No person has the right to terminate or have terminated his or
her life or to accelerate or have accelerated his or her death.
Euthanasia is not an acceptable concept in Irish constitutional juris-
prudence. There is a difference between positive acts designed to end
life, and the withdrawal of invasive medical treatment in order to al-
low nature to take its course. The right of a competent person to re-
fuse medical treatment is not in doubt and it was the opinion of a
majority of the Supreme Court that the ward had a similar right, ex-
cepting that the decision to refuse or not fell to the Court, exercising
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 412-13 (citing High Court opinion of Justice Lynch).
78. Id at 414 (Hamilton, C.J.).
79. Id. at 413-14.
80. Id at 426.
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its discretion on her behalf, as she could not do so herself. It follows
naturally that in so doing, the Court had paramount regard to the best
interests of the ward herself. In this case, I and three other judges
were of the opinion that her best interest lay in being allowed to
die8 1-as the High Court judge had ordered.
Once again, this was a case which elicited considerable controversy.
Identifying the proper legal and ethical boundaries of personal rights
is never easy, particularly when matters of life and death are in issue.
Nevertheless, such judgments must be made; lines have to be drawn.
And although division may result, it is essential to the health of a plu-
ralist society with a concern for human rights that such matters are
raised, and brought to public attention. For perhaps the first time in
Ireland, the Ward of Court case forced people into a conscious consid-
eration of the new ethical problems being thrown up by our exponen-
tially increasing technological ability. These problems will not go
away, anymore than the technology which brought them into being
will be "uninvented." As long ago as 1963, Martin Luther King
warned western humanity: "The means by which we live have outdis-
tanced the ends for which we live. Our scientific power has outrun
our spiritual power." 82
In considering these and other problems relating to life, the quality
of life, and the role of the State in protecting it, the basic philosophical
tools are already to hand: It is for the Court, and indeed for every
citizen, to mould their understanding of fundamental human rights
concepts in order to apply them to new situations. I have no doubt
but that it is for the legislative organ of the State to decide the broader
issues, including the redefinition of death. In the absence of such leg-
islation, it is a matter for the courts to decide, when the issue is raised
in proceedings before them: The issue cannot be avoided or ducked.
I would echo the words of William Binchy, Professor of Law at Trinity
College, Dublin, in which he challenges us not to bury our heads in
the sand, but rather to face the moral and legal storms ahead, saying:
I believe that in contemporary Ireland this is precisely the time
when these questions should be examined afresh. We live in an ex-
citing period when all the old orthodoxies have come under close
scrutiny and debate. Without revitalisation and fresh endorsement,
there would be a real danger that a society's value system might in
time harden into a desiccated orthodoxy and come to be regarded
merely as an external imposition of restrictive rules. The process of
open debate and reconsideration creates an opportunity for new in-
sights as well as a revitalised commitment to those values whose
true worth may have become hidden from view.83
81. Id. at 429-30; id. at 435 (O'Flaherty, J.); id. at 443 (Blayney, J.); id. at 465-66
(Denham, J.).
82. Martin Luther King, Strength to Love 74 (First Fortress Press 1981) (1963).
83. William Binchy, Pluralism, Liberty and the Right to Life, in Law and Liberty in
Ireland 132, 132-33 (Anthony Whelan ed., 1993).
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